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A PLEA FOR A UNIFORM PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
AND PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
JOHN D. CALAMARIt
JOSEPH M. PERILLOj
Any reader of advance sheets is well aware that most of the contract
decisions reported do not involve offer and acceptance or other subjects
usually explored in depth in a course in contracts but rather involve the
parol evidence rule and questions of interpretation,' topics given scant
attention in most courses in contracts.' Although a number of articles
have appeared recently on these subjects, for the most part they tend to
express the individual view of the writer as to what the law should be.'
While the authors of this paper will state their views, their principal pur-
pose is to set forth the basic problems involved and to offer a guide for
comprehending the reasons for the many contradictory decisions in these
areas. Much of the fog and mystery surrounding these subjects stems
from the fact that there is basic disagreement as to the meaning and ef-
fect of the parol evidence rule and as to the appropriate goals to be
achieved by the process of contractual interpretation. The cases and
treatises of the contract giants tend to conceal this conflict. While fre-
quently masking disagreement by using the same terminology, Professors
Williston and Corbin are often poles apart in the meaning they attach to
the same term. Often starting from what superficially appear to be the
same premises, they frequently advocate different results in similar fact
situations. The polarity of their views reflects conflicting value judg-
ments as to policy issues that are as old as our legal system and that are
likely to continue as long as courts of law exist. Although many writers
and courts have expressed their views on the subject and have made major
contributions to it, concentration on the analyses of Professors Williston
and Corbin will point up the fundamental bases upon which the conflict-
ing cases and views rest.
t Professor of Law, Fordham University.
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University.
1. Shepherd, Contracts in a Prosperity Year, 6 STAN. L. REv. 208, 223, 226 (1954).
2. No attempt will be made here to discuss these subjects as they relate to non-
contractual subjects such as wills and trusts.
3. See, e.g., Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CoRxELL L.Q. 161 (1965); Murray, The Parol Evidence Rude: A Clarification, 4 Du-
QuEsNm L. REv. 337 (1966); Patterson, The Interpretation and Constritction of Con-
tracts, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 833 (1964) ; Young, Equivocation in the Making of Agree-
inents, 64 CoLum. L. R~v. 619 (1964).
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I. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The Area of Substantial Agreement
There is a rule of substantive law which states that whenever con-
tractual intent is sought to be ascertained from among several expressions
of the parties, an earlier fentative expression will be rejected in favor of
a later expression that is final.' More simply stated, the contract made
by the parties supersedes tentative promises made in earlier negotiations.
Consequently, in determining the content of the contract, the earlier ten-
tative promises are irrelevant.
The parol evidence rule comes into play only when the last expres-
sion is in writing.5 Professor Corbin states the rule as follows: "When
two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of
that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent under-
standings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of vary-
ing or contradicting the writing."6  Professor Williston's formulation is
not to the contrary: "Briefly stated," he writes, "this rule requires, in
the absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or something of the kind,
the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, where the parties have
reduced their agreement to an integrated writing."7 Both agree that this,
too, is a rule of substantive law that also operates as an exclusionary rule
of evidence merely because prior understandings are irrelevant to the
process of determining the content of the final contract.' The similarity
between the parol evidence rule and the rule stated in the preceding para-
graph is obvious. The main and important difference is that where the
last expression is not in writing the jury determines whether the parties
intended the second expression to supersede the first.' This is to say
that this question of intention is determined as is any other question of
intention stemming from oral transactions. Where the later expression
is in writing, however, this question is usually determined by the trial
judge. At an early date it was felt (and the feeling strongly remains)
4. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (rev'd ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN]
McConmacK, EVIDENCE § 213 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoaicKI.
5. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 228, comment b (1932), suggests that the words of
an oral agreement may be chosen with such precision that there is an equivalent of an
integration. It adds that such a case is so unusual as not to require separate discussion.
Cf. 3 Co IN § 573 n.11.
6. 3 CoanIN § 573.
7. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. Jaeger 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WILLISTON].
8. 3 CoRBIN § 573; 4 WILLISTON § 631.
9. McComiicK § 214. Of course if reasonable men could reach only one reasonable
conclusion the question would be one for the court.
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that writings require the special protection that is afforded by removing
this issue from the province of unsophisticated jurors."
While it is unanimously agreed that the parol evidence rule applies
to prior expressions, and has no application to an agreement made subse-
quent to the writing, there is no unanimity as to expressions contempo-
raneous with the writing. Williston and the Restatement take the posi-
tion that contemporaneous expressions should be treated the same as prior
expressions except that contemporaneous writings should be deemed to
be a part of the integration.'" Corbin appears to argue that expressions
are either prior or subsequent to the writing and that therefore the word
"contemporaneous" merely clouds the issue. 3 Everyone agrees that the
parol evidence rule does not apply to a separate agreement; that is, an
agreement that has a separate consideration.'4
A distinction is drawn between a total and a partial integration.
Where the writing is intended to be final and complete, it is characterized
as a total integration and may be neither contradicted nor supplemented
by evidence of prior agreements or expressions. But where the writing
is intended to be final but incomplete, it is said to be a partial integration;
although such a writing may not be contradicted by evidence of prior
agreements or expressions, it may be supplemented by evidence of con-
sistent additional terms.'5 Thus, in approaching a writing, two questions
must be asked: (1) Is it intended as a final expression? (2) Is it in-
tended to be a complete expression?
10. MCCORMICK §§ 214-16. But see Murray, supra note 3, at 342, where he asks:
"If the parol evidence rule is based on distrust of juries because they lack sophistication
in comparing an oral expression with a subsequent writing, why should the rule apply
when both expressions are written?"
It is often assumed that the parol evidence rule protects the "haves" against the
"have nots," since it is the former who ordinarily draft written contracts and the latter
who receive the sympathy of the jury. See McCoaRciC 427-28. Surprisingly, however,
a substantial number of the reported cases dealing with the rule involve sizable trans-
actions between persons with apparently strong bargaining power. See, e.g., Hunt Foods
& Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966) (transaction
involving over $5,000,000) ; Millerton Agway Corp. v. Briarcliff Farms, 17 N.Y.2d 57,
268 N.Y.S.2d 18, 215 N.E.2d 341 (1966) ($1,000,000 guarantee); Hicks v. Bush, 10
N.Y.2d 488, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34, 180 N.E.2d 425 (1962) (involving 1,475,000 shares of a
holding company); Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Josefowitz, 5 N.Y.2d 998, 184 N.Y.S.2d
859, 157 N.F2d 730 (1959) (sale of business for $3,000,000).
11. Wagner v. Graziano Constr. Co., 390 Pa. 445, 136 A.2d 82 (1957) ; 3 Coi1 §
574 4 WILLISTOi § 632. Under certain statutes, parties may, by agreement, bar a subse-
quent oral modification. E.g., UNIFORM Co MRClAI. CODE § 2-209 (2) ; N.Y. GEN'L OBL.
LAw § 15-301.
12. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 237, comment a; 4 WILLISTON § 628.
13. 3 CoRIN § 577.
14. 3 CoRBIN § 594; 4 WILLISTON § 637.
15. 4 WILLISTON § 636. While Corbin is in agreement with the statement in the
text, he advocates abandonment of the term "partial integration" and argues that parties
rarely intend that an incomplete writing be considered final. 3 ComIN § 581.
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Is the writing intended as a final expression? Writings that evi-
dence a contract are not necessarily "final" embodiments of the contract.
Exchanges of letters or memoranda that show the conclusion of a con-
tract may have been intended fo be read in the light of more far-ranging
conversations and documents. Or, the parties may have intended their
writing to be tentative and preliminary to a final draft. In these cases,
the parol evidence rule does not bar enforcement of the entire agreement
as proved by the writing read in the context of prior and contempora-
neous expressions." It is agreed that any relevant evidence is admissible
to show that the writing was not intended to be final.' Although the
question of finality is frequently characterized as one of law in order to
remove it from the province of unsophisticated jurors, it is actually a
question of fact-one of intention-which the trial judge determines. "'
To be considered final the writing need not be in any particular form and
need not be signed. The crucial requirement is that the parties have re-
garded the writing as the final embodiment of their agreement.
Sometimes confused with this question of finality, but clearly dis-
tinguishable, is the frequently raised question of whether parties who
have made a tentative written agreement intended that no contract would
exist until a final writing was executed." On this issue of the existence
of the contract, the parol evidence rule is even more dearly inapplicable."
This question is treated as a normal question of intention, in accordance
with the rules of interpretation discussed in Part II of this article. The
16. Hechinger v. Ulacia, 194 App. Div. 330, 185 N.Y. Supp. 323 (1920); Atwater
v. Cardell, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1297, 54 S.W. 960 (1900). It is common to equate "finality"
with "completeness." E.g., in a case involving lack of completeness, Cardozo, C.J.,
wrote: "As soon as the inquiry is pursued, the defendant's concession of incompleteness
meets us, and the inference of finality is rebutted." Di Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co.,
220 N.Y. 391, 397-98, 115 N.E. 993, 995 (1917). This kind of imprecision, although
frequent, seems not to have affected the decisions. Another inconsistency in the use of
language is the frequent use of the term "integration" to mean "total integration."
17. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 228, comment a; 3 CORBIN § 588; 4 WILLISTON §
633 n.13.
18. McCoRMICK §§ 214-15. Corbin would allow greater participation by the jury.
See 3 CoRBIN § 595.
19. 1 WILLISTON § 28; 1 CORBIN § 30.
20. See cases cited 9 WIGMOR , EvmENCE § 2429 n.2 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMIoE] ; 3 CoRBIN § 588. The parol evidence rule, as a rule of substantive law, can-
not come into play until it is determined that the writing sought to be protected is opera-
tive. Thus Williston states: "Accordingly, it may be shown by parol evidence not only
that a writing was never executed or delivered as a contract, but also that the validity
of the agreement was impaired by fraud, illegality, duress, mistake, lack of or failure
of consideration rendering the agreement voidable or void. . . . If the writing is un-
sealed, it may be shown that the parties agreed by parol that the writing in question
should not become effective until some future day or the happening of some contingency,
if this is not inconsistent with the express terms of the writing." 4 WnLISToN § 634.
A good recent illustration of the last proposition is Hicks v. Bush, 10 N.Y2d 488, 225
N.Y.S.2d 34, 180 N.E.2d 425 (1962).
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determination is frequently made by the jury.2
Is the writing a complete or partial integration? Once it is deter-
mined that the writing is intended to be final and therefore an integra-
tion, it becomes necessary to ascertain whether the integration is com-
plete (so that it cannot be contradicted or supplemented) or only partial
(so that it cannot be contradicted but may be supplemented by evidence
of consistent additional terms). It seems to be generally agreed that
this is a question of law in the sense that it is determined by the trial
judge.2 2
The Parol Evidence Rule: The Major Area of Conflict
Apparent agreement by Professors Williston and Corbin, except as
noted, on the rules stated above conceals real conflict. The battleground
upon which they express disagreement is a major one: the concept of to-
tal integration. This, of course, is the area in which most of the cases
arise. Both assert that the existence of a total integration depends on the
intention of the parties. Williston does so primarily in a section en-
titled, "Integration Depends Upon Intent."23  Corbin's emphasis on in-
tent runs throughout his entire discussion of the rule." It appears, how-
ever, that in this context they use the term "intent" in ways that are
remarkably dissimilar. A typical fact situation will illustrate this.
A agrees to sell and B agrees to purchase Blackacre for $10,000. The
contract is in writing and in all respects appears complete on its face.
Prior to the signing of the contract A, in order to induce B's assent,
orally promises him in the presence of a number of reputable witnesses
that if B will sign the contract, A will remove an unsightly shack on A's
land across the road from Blackacre. May this promise be proved and
enforced? 2 This depends upon whether the writing is a total integration.
Williston argues that if the intention to have a total integration were
to be determined by the ordinary process of determining intention, the
parol evidence rule would be emasculated.2r He points out that the mere
existence of the collateral oral agreement would conclusively indicate that
the parties intended only a partial integration and that the only question
that would be presented is whether the alleged prior or contemporaneous
21. See Universal Prod. Co. v. Emerson, 36 Del. 553, 179 Atl. 387 (1935) (collect-
ing cases).
22. MCCORMICK § 215. Corbin dissents in part, arguing for the propriety of a
jury verdict in many cases. 3 CoRBIN § 595.
23. 4 Wn.LISTON § 633.
24. 3 ConiN §§ 573-95.
25. The facts given here are suggested by Mitchell v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E.
646 (1928).
26. 4 WILLISTON § 633.
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agreement was actually made. This would be a question of fact for the
jury, thus eliminating the special protection which the trial judge should
afford the writing.2 7
Williston, therefore, suggests that the issue of partial or total inte-
gration should be determined according to the following rules.
(1) If the writing expressly declares that it contains the entire
agreement of the parties (what is sometimes referred to as a merger
clause), the declaration conclusively establishes that the integration is to-
tal unless the document is obviously incomplete or the merger clause was
included as a result of fraud or mistake or any other reason exists that is
sufficient to set aside a contract. 28 As previously indicated, even a merger
clause does not prevent enforcement of a separate agreement supported
by a distinct consideration.29
(2) In the absence of a merger clause, the determination is made
by looking to the writing. Consistent additional terms may be proved if
the writing is obviously incomplete on its face3 or if it is apparently com-
plete but, as in the case of deeds, bonds, bills and notes, expresses the
undertaking of only one of the parties. 3
(3) Where the writing appears to be a complete instrument ex-
pressing the rights and obligations of both parties, it is deemed a total
integration unless the alleged additional terms were such as might natur-
ally be made as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the
parties to the written contract.
3 2
Thus in the hypothetical case given, Williston's view is that the col-
lateral promise to remove the unsightly shack could not be enforced. The
writing was apparently complete on its face and contracting parties would
ordinarily and naturally have included such a promise in the writing.
Iany might agree with this result,3" but can it be seriously argued that
this result is based on the parties' intent that the agreement be integrated?
How can a rule based on the intention of the parties be emasculated by
seeking to determine their actual expressed intent? It is quite clear that
27. At 9 WIGMORE § 2430, the author states that if the judge decides that the parol
evidence rule applies "he does not decide that the excluded negotiations did not take
place, but merely that if they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial."
If he determines that the parol evidence rule does not apply "he does not decide that the
negotiations did take place, but merely that if they did, they are legally effective, and
he then leaves to the jury the determination of fact whether they did take place." (Em-
phasis his.)
28. 4 WILLISTON § 633; cf. 3 CORmi § 578.
29. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
30. 4 WILLISTON §§ 633, 636.
31. 4 WILLISTON § 645; 3 CORBIN § 587.
32. 4 WILLISTON §§ 638, 639.
33. As did the court in Mitchell v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928).
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the expressed intent shown by overwhelming evidence is at variance with
an intent to have the writing serve as their complete agreement.
Professor Corbin takes a contrary view as to the proper result in our
hypothetical case: "It can never be determined by mere interpretation of
the words of a writing whether it is an 'integration' of anything, whether
it is 'the final and complete expression of the agreement' or is a mere
partial expression of the agreement."3  Elsewhere, he states: "Since the
very existence of an 'integration' . . . is dependent on what the parties
thereto say and do (necessarily extrinsic to the paper instrument), at the
time they draw that instrument 'in usual form,' are we to continue like
a flock of sheep to beg the question at issue, even when its result is to
'make a contract for the parties,' one that is vitally different from the
one they made themselves?"" When Professor Corbin speaks of the
intent of the parties he emphatically means their actual expressed intent.
Thus, two schools of thought are on the scene, one determined to
seek out the intent of the parties, the other speaking of intent but refus-
to consider evidence of what the intent actually was. Let us examine
Williston's approach further, since it is, at least linguistically, the more
puzzling. A key to understanding this approach is Gianni v. Russel &
Co.,3" which followed the not dissimilar approaches of Williston and Wig-
more.17  The parties signed a three-year lease in which the tenant agreed
not to sell tobacco in any form on the premises but was permitted to sell
soft drinks. The tenant alleged that his agreement to refrain from the
sale of tobacco was in consideration of an oral promise by the defendant
to give him exclusive rights to the sale of soft drinks on the premises.
The court held that evidence of the oral agreement was inadmissible, cit-
ing Williston and Wigmore. The court stated:
34. 3 CoRBiN § 581.
35. 3 CoRN § 582.
36. 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924).
37. Dean Wigmore's approach is 'by no means similar in all respects to Professor
Williston's. While Williston would ordinarily require that a writing be incomplete on
its face before permitting parol evidence to be introduced (4 WIILISTON § 633), Wig-
more argues that "intent must be sought where always intent must be sought . . .,
namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding circumstanwes.
The document alone will not suffice." 9 VIGMORE § 2430 (emphasis his). They each,
however, approach the question of intent to have a total integration mechanistically.
Wigmore suggests that the "chief and most satisfactory index for the judge is found in
the circumstance whether or not the particular element of the alleged extrinsic negotia-
tion is dealt with at all in the writing." 9 WIGMORE § 2430 (emphasis his). This is
somewhat different from Williston's test of "the inherent probability of parties who con-
tract under the circumstances in question, simultaneously making both the agreement in
writing which is before the court, and also the alleged parol agreement. The point is
not merely whether the court is convinced that the parties before it did in fact do this,
but whether parties so situated generally would or might do so." 4 WILLISTON § 638.
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In cases of this kind, where the cause of action rests en-
tirely on an alleged oral understanding concerning a subject
which is dealt with in a written contract it is presumed that the
writing was intended to set forth the entire agreement as to that
particular subject." (Emphasis added.)
While the court spoke of the parties' intention, it excluded evidence of
that intention. Logically, since the quantum of evidence would appear
to be irrelevant under the court's test, it would so rule if the transaction
were entered into on a national television network and were witnessed by
tens of millions of viewers. The key to the court's decision may be
found elsewhere in the opinion:
We have stated on several occasions recently that we propose to
stand for the integrity of written contracts.. We reiterate
our position in this regard."9
Fictions have been enormously important in the development of our
law. In an era when the law was deemed unchangeable and eternal, they
provided almost the only mechanism for avoiding the impact of rules
deemed unwise. Their use today serves only to obfuscate what should
be dear. Shorn of language indicating a fictitious search for intent, the
courts and writers who adopt a Willistonian approach are saying this:
When parties adopt a written form that gives every appearance of being
complete and final, they are required to incorporate in that form
their entire agreement. If they fail to do so,unincorporated agreements
relating to the same subject matter are void.
That the intention of the parties is not relevant in courts adopting
the same approach as Williston has been recognized in a number of
opinions. In a California case, testimony in violation of the parol evi-
dence rule was admitted without objection. The question presented was
whether the rule could be invoked despite the lack of objection. The
court held that the rule could be invoked, stating that the parol evidence
rule did not merely prohibit the proof of contemporaneous oral agree-
ments; rather it prohibited the making of such agreements."0
38. Gianni v. Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 324, 126 Atl. 791, 792 (1924).
39. Id. at 325, 126 Ati. at 792.
40. Dollar v. International Banking Corp., 13 Cal. App. 331, 109 Pac. 499 (1910).
Williston is in accord as to the holding. 4 WILLISTON § 631, text at n.18, indicating this
view to be the weight of authority. Many courts adopting this approach have not been
so forthright in language, preferring to say that writings apparently complete on their
face are "conclusively presumed to contain the whole contract as made." Eighmie v.
Taylor, 98 N.Y. 288, 296 (1885). The semantic tangle is shown by the dissenting
opinion of an able jurist in Mitchell v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928). He
commences his discussion with the concept that the parol evidence rule creates a "conclu-
340
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Professor Corbin has an easy task in demolishing the Willistonian
approach. In treating the matter of integration as a question of intent,
as Professor Williston purports to do, he shows the absurdity of exclud-
ing all relevant evidence of intent except the writing itself. But, as we
have seen, Williston, and such courts as the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Gianni v. Russel & Co. are unconcerned about the true intention
of the parties. Rather, shorn of rote language of fiction indicating a
search for intention, they are advocating and applying a rule of form.
Since (and even before) the common law had its genesis,4 there has
been a deeply-felt belief that transactions will be more secure, litigation
will be reduced, and the temptation to perjury will be removed, if every-
one will only use proper forms for his transactions. The Statute of Wills
and the Statute of Frauds are but examples of this belief. Professor
Corbin, by attacking the apparent arguments of Williston's position has
not expressly come to grips with the substance of his position. This is
not to suggest that either he or Professor Williston have been unaware
of the true nature of their disagreement. Rather, they seem for the most
part to have been content not to make explicit the basis of their differing
views. The purpose of the above discussion is to bring their differences
into bold relief so that the debate on this matter can break away from the
bland assumption that everyone agrees as to the statement of the parol
evidence rule and that there is merely some confusion as to its application.
The debate involves the question: is the public better served by giv-
ing effect to the parties' entire agreement written and oral, even at the
risk of injustice caused by the possibility of perjury and the possibility
that superseded documents will be treated as operative, or does the se-
curity of transactions require that, despite occasional injustices, persons
adopting a formal writing be required, on the penalty of voidness of their
oral and written side agreements, to put their entire agreement in the
formal writing.42
The conflict is an old one. Rules excluding evidence on the ground
sive presumption." Almost imperceptibly he shifts to "presumed to have intended," and
concludes by discussing what "was [actually?) intended." In the majority opinion,
rigorously Willistonian in result, despite "overwhelming evidence" that a collateral oral
agreement had been made, ("We are not dealing, however, with their [defendants']
moral delinquencies"), the court significantly refrains from using the term "intent."
41. On the historical development of the rule see 9 \VIG~oRE § 2426. For a classic
discussion of the desirability of requiring contracts to be put in writing, see 2 BENTHAM,
RATiONALE OF JuDIciAL EVIDENCE 454-513 (1827). It is to be noted, however, that, as a
prerequisite to imposition of such a rule, he advocated that the requirement be widely
publicized throughout the country. Moreover, he deemed it unfair that failure to com-
ply with the requirement should result in voidness of the agreement. Rather, an alleged
agreement not made in proper form would merely be regarded with suspicion.
42. For the policy considerations involved, see 3 CoRnix § 575; 4 WILLISTON § 633:
McCoR IcK §§ 210-16.
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that it is likely to be false are not strangers to the law. Formerly, parties
and interested third persons were incompetent to testify on the ground
that their testimony would be unworthy of belief." The Statute of
Frauds and the Statute of Wills embody similar considerations.44 The
authors believe, however, that the possibility of perjury is an insufficient
ground for interfering with freedom of contract by refusing to effectuate
the parties' entire agreement.
The whole thrust of our law for over a century has been directed to
the eradication of exclusionary rules of evidence in civil cases. Thus
parties may now testify, their interest in the outcome affecting only the
weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. Dissatisfaction with
rigid application of the parol evidence rule has resulted in the strained
insertion of fact situations into the categories where the parol evidence
rule is inapplicable. Thus, to circumvent the rule fraud has been found"
and reformation has been granted" in situations where these concepts are
not ordinarily deemed applicable. Moreover, whole categories of excep-
tions have been carved out; for example, a deed absolute may be shown
to be a mortgage.4 Professor Thayer's summation of the parol evidence
problem warrants repetition: "Few things are darker than this, or fuller
of subtle difficulties."4  When any rule of law is riddled through with
exceptions and applications difficult to reconcile, it is believed that litiga-
tion is stimulated rather than reduced.45 If the policy of the parol evi-
dence rule is to reduce the possibility of judgments predicated upon per-
jured testimony and superseded documents, it may be effectuated to a
large extent by continuing to leave control over determining the question
of intent to integrate in the hands of the trial judge." Finally, the trend
of modern decisions, as Williston suggests, "is toward increasing liberal-
43. See McCoRMICK § 65.
44. See 3 CORRIN § 575.
45. E.g., Bareham & McFarland Inc. v. Kane, 228 App. Div. 396, 240 N.Y. Supp.
123 (1930) (language sounding in warranty of performance held to be factual repre-
sentations). See Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CALIF. L.
REV. 877, 896 (1961) ("It does not take much manipulation to classify a promise as
either a warranty or a fact.").
46. E.g., Winslett v. Rice, 272 Ala. 25, 128 So. 2d 94 (1960) (breach of oral col-
lateral agreement constitutes "fraud" justifying reformation).
47. 3 CORBIN § 587; 4 WILLISTON § 635; 9 WIGMORE § 2437.
48. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 390 (1898).
49. See 3 CORBIN § 575. See also FIscH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 64, at 42 (1959):
"Because the decisions are ineffective as guides to determine in advance
whether or not the facts of a given transaction will come within one of the ex-
ceptions to the rule, the assumption, frequently enunuciated in judicial opinions,
that the rule is indispensable to business stability is specious . . . The deci-
sions as to these matters are valueless, contrary holdings being reached on al-
most identical facts."
50. The most thorough text treatment of this point is in McCoRMiCK §§ 214-16.
See also Murray, supra note 3.
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ity in the admission of parol agreements."' 1 This tendency of the courts is
in no small measure due to the influence of Professor Corbin's treatise.
2
It is of little moment whether the views of the authors of this article
as to what the law should be are convincing. The essential point being
made here is that there is no uniform parol evidence rule. Rather, there
are at least two rather dissimilar rules which, for convenience, may be
denominated the Corbin Rule and the Williston Rule. In view of the
confusion engendered by having two contradictory rules expressed in
the same terminology, it is remarkable that a few states have shown a
degree of consistency. New York, despite some inconsistent cases,"3
generally maintains a rigorously Willistonian approach." Rhode Island
seems recently to have adopted the Corbin approach with a Willistonian
touch, admitting extrinsic evidence out of the presence of the jury to
determine whether a total integration exists; the trial judge decides this
question on the Willistonian test of whether the alleged collateral agree-
ment "is such that the parties would naturally or normally" have included
it in the writing.5 This seems to be a sound indicia of intent, but not a
conclusive one. If the norm is that of the "reasonable man," this good
citizen would probably insist that the entire agreement be reduced to writ-
ing. The end result would seem to be pure Williston. Some states, such
as Connecticut, reach results consistent with Corbin's test, while utilizing
the most varied reasoning." Perhaps most states are consistently er-
51. 4 WILLISTON § 638.
52. Ample authority for this proposition can be found in the cases relying upon
Professor Corbin's analysis and cited by him in 3 ColsiN §§ 573-95. See, more recently,
United States v. Clementon Sewerage Authority, 365 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1966) (New Jer-
sey law).
53. See Peo v. Kennedy, 16 App. Div. 2d 306, 227 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1962) ( purporting
to rely upon the exception to the rule that states that a condition precedent to formation
of a contract may be proved by parol; this case clearly involved no such condition) ;
Higgs v. De Maziroff, 263 N.Y. 473, 189 N.E. 555 (1934) (parol evidence improperly
admitted without objection may be considered).
54. Mitchell v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928) ; Oxford Commercial Co.
v. Landau, 12 N.Y.2d 362, 190 N.E.2d 230, 239 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1963) ; 49 COIU'TEL L.Q.
311 (1964) ; Meadowbrook Nat'l Bank v. Bzura, 20 App. Div. 2d 287, 246 N.Y.S.2d 787
(1964). Recent law review material indicates a similar consistency in two states. See
Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 269, 279-82 (1962) ;
McDonough, The Parol Evidence Ride in South Dakota and the Effect of Section -202
of the U.C.C., 10 S.D.L. Rv. 60 (1965).
55. Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington College, - R.I.- , 199 A.2d-586 (1964).
In a somewhat surprising passage Professor Corbin (CoRniN § 595, last paragraph)
lends support to this test. This seems inconsistent with his entire discussion of the ques-
tion of intent.
56. State Finance Corp. v. Ballestrini, 111 Conn. 544, 150 AtI. 700 (1930) (articu-
lating Williston's test, but was it in fact applied?) ; Harris v. Clinton, 142 Conn. 204, 112
A.2d 885 (1955) (although he is not cited, the reasoning seems to be pure Corbin);
Greenwich Plumbing & Heating Co. v. A. Barbaresi & Son, Inc., 147 Conn. 580, 164
A.2d 405 (1960). (parol evidence of collateral agreement admitted because of ambiguity
of the writing; analysis, but not result, criticised in 3 CoRsiN § 582 n.84 [Supp. 1964]).
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ratic.57 Such is the confusion that in any state a decision may be reached
which is ludicrous in result and analysis"8 or sensible in result but strained
in analysis. 9
It is hoped that once the source of confusion is comprehended, courts
will achieve a greater degree of consistency by consciously choosing one
of the competing rules. The widespread adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code may give impetus to a consistent and enlightened approach
if it is applied to cases not specifically under its coverage. An official
comment to section 2-202 states:
[C] onsistent additional terms, not reduced to writing, may
be proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended
by both parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all
terms. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon,
they would certainly have been included in the document in the
view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be
kept from the trier of fact. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Code requires the court to ascertain the intention of the parties,
and it can be assumed that the codifiers meant a true expressed intention
and not a fictitious intention. The trial judge has an important function
in making this determination. If he finds that it is certain the parties
would have incorporated the additional term into the writing if they had
agreed upon it, he excludes evidence of the alleged term from the jury's
consideration. If it is merely improbable that the parties would have
agreed to the term without incorporating it into the writing, the jury
must determine whether the additional term was agreed upon.6" The
Code, of course, does not purport to affect the power of the court to set
aside or direct a verdict where the evidence supporting an alleged supple-
mentary term is flimsy. Thus, the writing is protected at two stages.
First, there is a preliminary finding, based on an external standard, as
57. E.g., Virginia, see Note, 7 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1966); Pennsylvania,
see CoasiN § 577 n.34 (Supp. 1964).
58. In Townsend v. Standard Indus., Inc., 235 Ark. 951, 363 S.W.2d 535 (1962),
the parties had been operating under an oral agreement for some time. They subse-
quently memorialized this in a writing which was held to be inoperative for lack of
"mutuality of obligation." The court further held, on the pleadings, that since the writ-
ing had been adopted as an integration, evidence of the prior oral agreement was in-
admissible. The decision is scorchingly criticised in Note, 17 Amx. L. REv. 220 (1963).
An integration supersedes prior agreements because it is a final contract. A writing
which is not a contract is no integration. Moreover, a glance at the writing reproduced
in the opinion shows it to be a brief memorandum and, even if mutuality of obligation
were shown, probably not a total integration.
59. See cases cited notes 45 & 46 supra.
60. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1966).
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to whether any evidence will be heard by the jury. Second, the court re-
tains its control over the quality and quantity of evidence required to sup-
port a verdict.
II. INTERPRETATION
Standards of Interpretation
Since there is no "lawyers' Paradise" where "all words have a fixed
precisely ascertained meaning,"" frequently "2 the problem is to inter-
pret 3 the language and other manifestations of the parties. The
Restatement says: "Interpretation of words and of other manifestations
of intention forming an agreement [or having reference to the forma-
tion of an agreement] 4 is the ascertainment of the meaning to be given
to such words and manifestations."
The question then is whose meaning is to be given to an agreement,
communication, or other manifestation of intent. The Restatement lists
six possible standards of interpretation, that is, six vantage points which
might be used in making this interpretation."8 These standards are:
1. the standard of general usage;
2. a standard of limited usage, which would attach the mean-
ing given to language in a particular locality, or by a sect or
those engaged in a particular occupation, or by an alien popu-
lation or those using a local dialect (the distinction between
1 and 2 is a difference in degree, since generality of usage
does not necessarily imply universality);
3. a mutual standard, which would allow only such meanings
as conform to an intention common to both or all the parties,
and would attach this meaning although it violates the usage
of all other persons;
4. an individual standard, which would attach to words or
other manifestations of intention whatever meaning the per-
son employing them intended them to express, or that the
61. THAYEi, op. cit. supra note 48, at 428-29.
62. See note 1 spra.
63. On the distinction between interpretation and construction see 3 CoRaiN § 534;
4 WNILisToN § 602; Patterson, supra note 3, at 835-36. Note that these authorities are
not in accord as to the proper use of these terms.
64. The words in brackets indicate that this process called interpretation is also
utilized to determine whether there is a contract. Accord, 3 CoNni § 32. But § 58 of
the RESTATEMENT and the RESTATEMENT SEcoND seem to indicate that the normal process
of interpretation does not apply to an acceptance. See also United States v. Braunstein,
75 F.Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
65. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 226.
66. Id. § 227.
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person receiving the communication understood from it;"
5. a standard of reasonable expectation, which would attach to
words or other manifestations of intention the meaning
which the party employing them should reasonably have ap-
prehended that they would convey to the other party;
6. a standard of reasonable understanding, which would attach
to words or other manifestations of intention the meaning
which the person to whom the manifestations are addressed
might reasonably give to them.
Williston chooses two different standards depending upon whether
there is an integration. When there is no integration the standard is the
meaning that the party making the manifestation should reasonably ex-
pect the other party to give it-the standard of reasonable expectation, a
test based upon the objective theory of contracts." However, there are
two exceptions. First, where there is an ambiguity69 the following rules
are applicable: (a) Where neither party knows or has reason to know
of the ambiguity or where both parties know or have reason to know of
the ambiguity it is given the meaning that each party intended it to bear.70
This means as a practical matter that if the parties give the ambiguous
expression the same meaning there is a contract, but if they give it a dif-
ferent meaning there is no contract,71 at least if the ambiguity relates to
a material term. (b) Where one party knows or has reason to know of
the ambiguity and the other does not, it bears the meaning given to it by
the latter-an individual standard."M  As a practical matter this means
that there is a contract based upon the meaning of the party who is with-
out fault.7 A second exception to the standard of reasonable expecta-
tion is that "where the law gives to certain words an established mean-
ing, this meaning is less readily controlled by the standard of interpreta-
tion . . . than is the meaning of other words."74
As to integrated7 1 writings Williston's standard of interpretation "is
67. Standards (3) and (4) are subjective, the others are objective.
68. 4 WILLISTON § 605.
69. No distinction is made between latent and patent ambiguity. 4 WILLISToN § 627.
The best known illustration of a latent ambiguity is Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 Hurl. &
Co. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864) (the "Peerless" case). See also Young,
Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 COLum. L. REv. 619 (1964) ; Patterson,
The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 833 (1964).
70. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 233; 4 WILLISToN § 605.
71. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71; 4 WILLISTON § 605.
72. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 233; 4 WILLISTON § 605.
73. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 71; 4 WILLISTON § 605.
74. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 234. See also 4 WILLISTON §§ 614, 615.
75. Williston, for the purposes of interpretation, treats a non-integrated writing
which is necessary to satisfy the Statute of Frauds as if it were an integration. 4
WILLISTON § 604.
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the meaning that would be attached to the integration by a reasonably
intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all
the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the
integration, other than oral statements by the parties of what they in-
tended it to mean.""6  This is the standard of limited usage." Local and
trade usages of terms used in the contract are to be considered and, if the
parties contracted with reference to them, are determinative."
Basically there are two differences in Williston's approach to an
integration as opposed to a non-integration."9
First, in the case of a non-integration the issue of ambiguity may be
raised simply by the assertion that the parties mutually manifested an
intention to adopt a meaning different from the ordinary or local mean-
ing; for example, that the word "horse" means "cow" or that the word
"buy" means "sell."8 " However, this could not be done in the case of an
integration because in determining whether there is an ambiguity "oral
statements of what the parties intended it to mean," even if expressed to
one another, are excluded. Stated differently, an integration contains
an ambiguity only when, in the light of all of the surrounding circum-
stances (except the oral statements of what the parties intended), the
words admit of several normal or popular meanings or there is doubt
whether the normal or some local trade meaning was intended. Thus if
there were evidence that in a particular locality the word "buy" meant
"sell," evidence of what the parties intended would be admissible.8"
According to Williston there is a second difference between an in-
tegrated and a non-integrated transaction. We have already seen that
where both parties to a non-integrated agreement justifiably attach dif-
ferent meanings to a material term there is no contract.8 2 But in similar
circumstances if the agreement is integrated, there is, according to Wil-
liston, a contract in accordance with the meaning of "a reasonably intel-
ligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the
circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the in-
tegration."8 In the exceptional case in which this test produces an un-
76. REsTATErENT, CONTRACTs § 230.
77. 4 WiLumsTo § 607.
78. See generally Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1101 (1965). See also UNIoR CoM-
ERCIAL CODE §§ 1-205, 2-202.
79. It should be noted that the rule relating to the situation where "the law gives
to certain words an established meaning" is also applicable to integrated writings.
WILoLsTO §§ 614, 615.
80. 4 WnMIsToN § 605.
81. 4 WiuaisTox §§ 608-13, 617, 629, 630.
82. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
83. RESTAFrMENT, CoNTAcrs § 230; 4 WLSTON § 610A.
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certain or ambiguous result, the rules governing the interpretation of
non-integrated agreements are applicable.84
Williston expressly recognizes that his standards of interpretation
may result in the interpretation of an agreement in such a way as to con-
form to the intention of neither party.85  For him the contract acquires
a life and meaning of its own, separate and apart from the meanings the
parties attach to their agreement. "It is not primarily the intention of
the parties which the court is seeking, but the meaning of the words at the
time and place when they were used.""8 He is explicit in stating why this
should be so. "A facility and certainty of interpretation is obtained,
which, though not ideal, is so much greater than is obtainable" by use of
a less rigid standard.87 The certainty so obtained "is more than an ade-
quate compensation for the slight restriction put upon the power to grant
and contract." '
Williston's position has deep roots in our legal system. Long ago,
Justice Brook thundered from the bench: "The party ought to direct his
meaning according to the law, and not the law according to his meaning,
for if a man should bend the law to the intent of the party rather than
the intent of the party to the law, this would be the way to introduce
barborousness and ignorance and to destroy all learning and diligence."8
Bentham, for one, disagreed vehemently, calling such an approach
"an enormity, an act of barefaced injustice . . . a practice exactly upon
a par (impunity excepted) with forgery.""0  Professor Corbin, although
slightly more restrained in language, agrees that in every case one must
take into account "the intention and the understanding of each of the
two parties."'" If they coincide there is a contract. If they do not co-
incide as to material terms there is no contract unless one of the parties
is more guilty than the other for the difference in meaning attached.92
This is the position taken by the Restatement, Second." At first glance
84. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 231.
85. 4 WILLISTON §§ 607-07A; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 230, illus. 1.
86. 4 WILLISTON § 613.
87. Id. § 612.
88. Ibid.
89. Throckmerton v. Tracy, 1 Plow. 145, 162, 75 Eng. Rep. 222, 251 (K.B. 1554)
90. 5 BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 41, at 590.
91. 3 CoanIN § 542; Corbin, supra note 3, at 189.
92. 3 CORDIN §§ 538, 539.
93. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 21A reads as follows:
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties
attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the
others; or
(b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the meaning attached
by the other.
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it might appear that, under this test, in a great many cases no contract
results since rarely do the intentions of the parties completely coincide,
even as to material terms. However, in determining whether the parties
justifiably misunderstood one another, the standard of reasonable ex-
pectations is utilized 94-- the standard adopted by Williston for non-
integrated contracts. A contract exists in accord with the understanding,
if any, that the promisee reasonably could rely upon, provided the promi-
sor had reason to foresee this understanding. Consequently, in the usual
case, despite the presence of a misunderstanding, a contract results on the
terms understood by the party who is less at fault for the misunderstand-
ing. This properly takes into account that speech is not only and not
primarily the expression of thought, but is used "in order to influence the
conduct of others."95
Rules of Interpretation and Their
Relationship to Standards of Interpretation
In addition to the standards of interpretation just discussed there
are also rules of interpretation. Here again Williston and Corbin take a
different approach dictated primarily by their difference in approach to
the question of standards of interpretation.
Williston distinguishes between primary and secondary rules of in-
terpretation. The primary rules as stated in section 235 of the Restate-
ment are set forth in footnote 96. These primary rules apply to both in-
tegrated and non-integrated transactions and "serve merely as guides to
achieving a final result, namely, the correct application of the proper
(2) The manifestations of the parties are operative in accordance with the
meaning attached to them by one of the parties if
(a) that party does not know of any different meaning attached by the other,
and the other knows the meaning attached by the first party; or
(b) that party has no reason to know of any different meaning attached by
the other, and the other has reason to know the meaning attached by the first
party.
It is interesting to note that although illustration 2 of § 71 of the Restatement is the
same as illustration 5 of § 21A of the Restatement Second, the result reached is different.
94. 3 ConIx § 538.
95. GARDINEm, THE THEORY OF SPEECH AND LANGUAGE 19 (1932).
96. The following rules aid the application of the standards stated in §§ 230, 233.
(a) The ordinary meaning of language throughout the country is given to
words unless circumstances show that a different meaning is applicable.
(b) Technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning unless
the context or a usage which is applicable indicates a different meaning.
(c) A writing is interpreted as a whole and all writings forming part of the
same transaction are interpreted together.
(d) All circumstances accompanying the transaction may be taken into con-
sideration, subject in case of integrations to the qualifications stated in § 230.
(e) If the conduct of the parties subsequent to a manifestation of intention
indicates that all the parties placed a particular interpretation upon it, that
meaning is adopted if a reasonable person could attach it to the manifestation.
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standard."9 The secondary rules set forth in footnote 98 are also applic-
able to both integrated and non-integrated transactions, but need not be
invoked except where the meaning of words or other manifestations of
intent remain doubtful after application of the appropriate standard of
interpretation, aided by the primary rules of interpretation.99
Corbin, of course, does not distinguish between primary and second-
ary rules; the principal standard of interpretation selected by him, the in-
tention of the parties, does not require the aid of the primary rules. 00
Further, he does not agree that the secondary rules can be applied only in
the case of an ambiguity.1"' Corbin makes it clear that rules of inter-
pretation "are to be taken as suggestive working rules only.'
0 2
What Williston calls the secondary rules of interpretation would ap-
pear to have little relevance once it has been determined that the applic-
able standard of interpretation is a mutual or an individual standard.
According to Williston, a mutual or individual standard is applied when
there is an ambiguity and the parties testify to their understanding;103
97. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 235 comment a.
98. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236 reads as follows:
Where the meaning to be given to an agreement or to acts relating to the for-
mation of an agreement remains uncertain after the application of the standards
of interpretation stated in §§ 230, 233, with the aid of the rules stated in § 235,
the following rules are applicable:
(a) An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective mean-
ing to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which
leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.
(b) The principal apparent purpose of the parties is given great weight in de-
termining the meaning to be given to manifestations of intention or to any
part thereof.
(c) Where there is an inconsistency between general provisions and specific
provisions, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify the meaning of the general
provisions.
(d) Where words or other manifestations of intention bear more than one
reasonable meaning an interpretation is preferred which operates more strongly
against the party from whom they proceed, unless their use by him is prescribed
by law.
(e) Where written provisions are inconsistent with printed provisions, an in-
terpretation is preferred which gives effect to the written provisions.
(f) Where a public interest is affected an interpretation is preferred which
favors the public.
Corbin's statement of these rules generally corresponds to Williston's. See 3 CORBIN §§
545-50. Corbin adds some additional rules in § 552.
99. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 236, comment a. In his text Williston makes it
clear that in the case of an integration these secondary rules come into play "only where
after the primary rules or principles have been applied, the local meaning of the writing
is still uncertain or ambiguous." He adds "the same rules are applicable to informal
parol agreements, but, as has been seen, the standard there sought to be applied is
slightly different." 4 WILLISTON § 617.
100. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
101. 3 COIIN § 542.
102. 3 CORBIN § 535.
103. 4 WILLISTON § 95. As we have seen, in the case of an integrated writing, an
ambiguity exists, according to his test, only after application of the standard of limited
'3-50
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according to Corbin, it is applied in every case where the parties testify
to their understandings.'" The only relevance these rules of interpreta-
tion could have is on the issue of who knows or should know of the am-
biguity (Williston) or who knows or should know of the understanding
of the other party (Corbin).
Are Questions of Interpretation Questions
of Fact or Questions of Law?
Williston's rules on this subject may be summarized as follows: Al-
though the meaning of language is really a question of fact, in many in-
stances it has been determined that this question should be treated as a
question of law in the sense that the determination should be made by
the trial judge."5 The general rule is that the interpretation of a writing
is for the court. Where, however, the meaning of a writing is uncertain
or ambiguous... and extrinsic' ° evidence is introduced in aid of its inter-
pretation, the question of its meaning should be left to the jury except
where, after taking the extrinsic evidence into account, the meaning is so
clear that reasonable men could reach only one conclusion, in which event
the court should decide the issue as it does when the resolution of any
question of fact is equally dear. Where the writing is ambiguous and
extrinsic evidence is not introduced, the question is one of law. Even
where the contract is oral, if the exact words used by the parties are not
in dispute, the court will deal with the matter in the same way as if the
contract were written.0 8 It would appear that Corbin is generally in ac-
cord with these views."'
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND
RULES AND STANDARDS OF INTERPRETATION
Before the parol evidence rule may be invoked, the judge must de-
termine that the parties intended the writing to be final."0 The question
of intent is determined according to the standards and rules of interpre-
tation discussed above."' Conversely, the parol evidence rule should
usage, aided -by the primary rules of interpretation, fails to give the writing one definite
meaning.
104. 3 CoaniN § 538.
105. 4 W.ulsTow § 616.
106. It is important to recall once again that under Williston's view the word am-
biguous has different connotations in the cases of integrated and non-integrated trans-
actions.
107. The term extrinsic evidence includes all evidence outside of the writing in-
cluding parol evidence.
108. See note 5 supra.
109. 3 CoRBiN § 554.
110. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 61-95 supra and accompanying text.
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have no effect on the question of interpretation-the meaning of lan-
guage. Stated otherwise, before the parol evidence rule can be invoked
to exclude evidence, the meaning of the writing must be ascertained since
one may not determine whether a writing is being contradicted or sup-
plemented until one knows what the writing means.
This should mean that evidence of prior and contemporaneous ex-
pressions is always admissible to aid in determining the meaning of the
integration, and Corbin so states. 1 ' Williston is cautiously in accord.
Such evidence may be introduced, he grants, but not to prove that the
intention of the parties is at variance with the appropriate local meaning
of the words."' The evidence may be considered only on the question of
whether the parties contracted with reference to a local or trade usage or,
if this local or trade meaning is ambiguous, on the question of what
meaning the parties attached to the words. Even accepting his premise
that the true intention of the parties is usually irrelevant, there are two
difficulties with Williston's position on the admissibility of this evidence.
First, it assumes that the court can successfully ignore the parties' real
intention when it is shown by the evidence. Second, it involves a great
deal of tension with the exclusionary aspects of his version of the parol
evidence rule. If evidence of prior and contemporaneous expressions is
not admissible to prove terms supplementary to or at variance with a total
integration,"4 but is admissible to show the meaning of the integration,
the astute trial lawyer will characterize his evidence on what are really
supplementary or contradictory terms as evidence on the true meaning of
the contract. Although the function of this evidence is to demonstrate
the "meaning of the writing," once it is admitted the court may find it
difficult (and unjust) to disregard what may be clear and convincing
proof that the writing is not the complete agreement of the parties. Wil-
liston's grand structure meticulously separating the parol evidence rule,
standards of interpretation, and primary and secondary rules of interpre-
tation seems to collapse into this procedural pitfall."'
It is little wonder, then, that many courts that share Williston's con-
cern for the "security of transactions" have retreated even further from
the intention of the parties to the almost universally condemned" 6 "plain
112. 3 CORBIN §§ 542, 542A, 543, 579.
113. 4 WILLISTON § 630.
114. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
115. There are other devices to achieve the same end. "[Ilt is a rare set of facts
that will forestall, without any exceptional ingenuity, the inclusion in a pleading of at
least one cause of action or defense, such as fraud, delivery on condition or failure of
consideration, which will open the door to the introduction of extrinsic evidence." Fisch,
New York Evidence 42 (1959).
116. 3 CoRBIN § 542; Grismore, CONTRACTS § 97 (1965) ; McCoRmicK § 219;
THAYER, op. cit. supra note 48, ch. 10; 9 WIGMORE §§ 2461-62; 4 WILLISTON § 629.
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meaning rule," holding that if a writing appears clear and unambiguous
on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the
instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature.1 ' This
approach excludes evidence of trade usage and prior dealings between the
parties as well as evidence of surrounding circumstances and prior and
contemporaneous expressions. The latest legislative ruling on the matter,
the Uniform Commercial Code, explicitly condemns the plain meaning
rule"8 and explicitly allows use of evidence of a course of dealing or
course of performance to explain the agreement "unless carefully
negated.""
9
IV. CONCLUSION
Professors Williston and Corbin are in fundamental disagreement
as to the parol evidence rule and methods of interpretation. In addition,
other writers have expressed their opinions. When one reads the cases
of a particular jurisdiction one notes that very often there are inconsistent
decisions which adopt the approaches of Williston, of Corbin, and even
of other writers."
This confusion can be dissipated if it is realized that these different
views exist, and if courts make an effort to follow one view consistently.
The authors believe that Corbin's views, which are being incorporated in
the Restatement, Second, merit adoption because they conform better to
the expectations of contracting parties as to what the law should be. It
seems intolerable that a party should be denied his day in court to prove
what his contract was, on the mere ground that he is likely to mislead the
117. One can hardly know if a writing is clear and unambiguous without knowing
the surrounding circumstances. 3 CoRBIN § 542. However, even Corbin, the most severe
critic of the rule, concedes that cases invoking it are "extremely numerous." 3 COmIN §
542 n.78. Even so enlightened a court as the New York Court of Appeals has invoked
it. Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landau, 12 N.Y.S.2d 362, 190 N.E.2d 230, 239 N.Y.S.2d
865 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 2 N.Y.2d 456, 141 N.E.2d 590,
161 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1957). But see note 120 infra.
118. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, comment 1. See also UNIFORM CommER-
ciAL CODE § 1-205.
119. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, comment 2. The Code may also elimi-
nate another source of confusion in the area of interpretation. Frequently courts have
used the tool of "strict construction" to deny clauses deemed unconscionable their in-
tended effect. E.g., Ball v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 281 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20
(1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d 836 (1954) (exculpation clause strictly con-
strued) ; cf. Tunld v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963)
(clause in similar circumstances held void). The Code encourages the forthright ap-
proach of striking down unconscionable clauses. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
120. For example, while there are cases in New York following the plain meaning
rule (see note 117 supra), there are others which follow Williston. E.g., Rasmussen v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 267 N.Y. 129, 195 N.E. 821 (1935); Lipson v. Bradford Dyeing
Ass'n, 266 App. Div. 595, 42 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1943). Cases purporting to follow the
plain meaning rule are often quick to find an expression ambiguous. E.g., Udell v. Co-
hen, 282 App. Div. 685, 122 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1953).
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court by perjurious or fraudulent evidence. In many other fields of law
this kind of a piori evaluation of evidence has been eliminated. The
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code creates a necessity for re-
evaluation of this approach in commercial cases and the opportunity for
its re-evaluation in all contract cases.12'
121. It is unlikely that articles 1 and 2 of the Code will be restricted to the specific
areas they explicitly govern. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise
for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUJm. L. REv. 880 (1965). Indeed, the process of applying
§ 2-202 of the Code to non-sales transactions has already begun. Ciunci v. The Wella
Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 109, 271 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1966).
